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Abstract
Can computer simulation results be evidence for hypotheses about real-world sys-
tems and phenomena? If so, what sort of evidence? Can we gain genuinely new 
knowledge of the world via simulation? I argue that evidence from computer simu-
lation is aptly characterized as higher-order evidence: it is evidence that other evi-
dence regarding a hypothesis about the world has been collected. Insofar as particu-
lar epistemic agents do not have this other evidence, it is possible that they will gain 
genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation. I illustrate with examples 
inspired by uses of simulation in meteorology and astrophysics.
1 Introduction
Computer simulations are ubiquitous in science and engineering today. They fre-
quently serve as replacements for traditional experimentation and observation. Phi-
losophers of science, however, disagree about the extent to which computer simula-
tion, as a methodological practice, really is like experimentation and observation, 
with similar epistemic powers (see e.g. Barberousse et  al. 2009; Beisbart 2012, 
2018; Giere 2009; Humphreys 2013; Lusk 2016; Morrison 2009; Parker 2009, 2017; 
Winsberg 2010). Those who emphasize the differences have argued that, while com-
puter simulation can provide us with knowledge of the world in the way that argu-
mentation does—by helping us to recognize the implications of our existing knowl-
edge—it cannot provide us with knowledge that goes beyond this; observation and 
traditional experimentation, by contrast, are capable of doing so, because in these 
practices we “gather experience” (Beisbart 2012, p. 425). On this view, observa-
tion and experimentation have the potential to provide us with what might be called 
genuinely new knowledge of the world, while computer simulation does not.
A closely-related but little-discussed question is whether computer simulation, 
like experimentation and observation, is capable of providing evidence for hypoth-
eses about real-world systems and phenomena (hereafter, ‘hypotheses about the 
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world’). Intuitions pull in both directions. On one hand, weather forecasts produced 
by today’s computer models seem to provide good grounds for revising our beliefs 
about tomorrow’s weather. And scientists in a wide range of fields—chemistry, 
physics, meteorology, hydrology, sociology, medicine and more—at least sometimes 
seem to treat simulation results as evidence for claims about the world. On the other 
hand, if computer simulation is at bottom an attempt to calculate the implications of 
a set of modelling assumptions, then simulation results, like results derived from a 
scientific theory by hand, seem to be predictions rather than evidence; they are the 
kind of thing we might seek evidence for, by making observations of the real-world 
systems and phenomena referenced in those predictions.
Here I attempt to reconcile these competing intuitions, while also challenging the 
view that simulation is a methodology incapable of providing genuinely new knowl-
edge of the world. I do this, first, by arguing that evidence from computer simulation 
is aptly characterized as higher-order evidence: it is evidence that there exists other 
evidence for a hypothesis h about the world. It is then a short step to the conclusion 
that it is possible for epistemic agents to gain genuinely new knowledge of the world 
via simulation: insofar as particular agents either do not have the other evidence e 
whose existence is indicated by simulation results, or else lack background knowl-
edge in virtue of which e can be interpreted as bearing on h, they can obtain new 
information regarding h from those simulation results which, in some cases, might 
be sufficient for them to come to know that h. Thus, while it is true that simulation 
models do not provide information about the world that goes beyond that which is 
already implicit in their assumptions, particular epistemic agents—including even 
scientists and engineers using simulation models—might still gain genuinely new 
knowledge of the world via simulation.
The discussion proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, I introduce some basic terminol-
ogy related to computer simulation. In Sect.  3, I argue for the main theses of the 
paper: that computer simulation results can be evidence for hypotheses about the 
world, that such evidence is aptly characterized as higher-order evidence, and that it 
is possible to gain genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation. In Sect. 4, 
I show that it is plausible that scientists today do sometimes obtain evidence and 
knowledge from computer simulation, with the help of two extended examples from 
meteorology and astrophysics. In Sect. 5, I consider what is special about computer 
simulation as a source of evidence. Finally, Sect. 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2  Computer Simulation
It will be helpful to first clarify some terminology related to computer simulation. In 
what follows, a computer simulation model is a computer program that is designed 
to iteratively solve a set of dynamical modelling equations, either exactly or approxi-
mately, following a particular algorithm.1 The models that will be the focus of this 
1 One might object, as an anonymous referee did, that it is wrong to say that the computer program is 
a “model”, since a program is a list of instructions while a model is not. We of course can choose to 
reserve the label “computer simulation model” for the set of equations that the computer solves during 
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paper are ones that have particular real-world targets, i.e. particular real-world sys-
tems (such as earth’s climate system) or particular instances of a real-world phe-
nomenon (such as a set of financial crises that occurred in the twentieth century). A 
computer simulation occurs when the program that constitutes the computer simula-
tion model is successfully executed by a computer; starting from an initial assign-
ment of values to the variables of the modelling equations (i.e. initial conditions), 
the computer calculates values for a sequence of later times by repeatedly solving, or 
estimating solutions to, the dynamical equations. The computer’s calculated values 
for those times are the solutions of the simulation.
In the simplest cases, the results of a simulation are the records of some or all of 
those solutions, stored in the computer’s physical memory or on some external stor-
age device. In other cases, solutions undergo additional processing after the simula-
tion is completed, e.g. to correct for known model biases; the results associated with 
the simulation will then be records of some or all of the outputs of that additional 
processing. In either case, results are interpreted as claims about the modelled sys-
tem, e.g. that it will or would have particular properties at a particular time. Not 
infrequently, simulation studies involve multiple simulations whose results are inter-
preted or analyzed together, as we will see in an example in Sect. 4.
A computer simulation procedure is a procedure for generating results using a 
computer simulation model. It includes (at least) steps for obtaining one or more 
sets of initial conditions for the model, for launching one or more simulations, and 
for mapping some or all of the solutions of the simulation(s) to claims about the 
world. For example, to generate weather forecasts for particular cities, a national 
meteorological office might follow a procedure that involves estimating initial con-
ditions with the help of recent weather observations, launching a simulation of the 
atmosphere with those initial conditions, and mapping (e.g. with the help of bias 
corrections and other steps) some of the solutions generated during the simulation to 
estimates of temperature at particular geographical locations. A physical implemen-
tation of the various components of the procedure—the initial condition estimation, 
simulation and mapping algorithms implemented on particular digital computers—
constitutes a computer simulation system.
A computer simulation system is reliable in a domain of application if, and to the 
extent that, the majority of results that it would produce in that domain are true (or 
are accurate enough, given an agent’s tolerance for error), when interpreted as claims 
about the world. What is usually desired in practice is that a simulation system is 
highly reliable, i.e., that it would almost always produce accurate-enough results in 
the domain of application of interest. Note that a domain of application can be quite 
narrow. For instance, one might be interested in the reliability of a weather forecast-
ing system for predicting next-day high temperatures for London Heathrow airport 
only, and for just the next calendar year. The system might be quite reliable when it 
comes to predicting these temperatures to within some acceptable margin of error, 
a simulation. It is not uncommon in scientific practice, however, to use the term “computer simulation 




but not nearly so reliable when the domain of application encompasses next-day 
high temperatures for e.g. all major European airports over the coming five years.2 
Note also that, whether a simulation system is reliable in a domain of application 
does not depend on how many times it is actually used. What matters is that, if it 
were used sufficiently many times to answer questions within that domain, then the 
majority of its results would meet some specified standard of accuracy.
3  Evidence and Knowledge from Computer Simulation
With these preliminaries, we now turn to three key questions: Can results from com-
puter simulations constitute evidence for hypotheses about the world? If so, what 
kind of evidence? Can agents gain genuinely new knowledge of the world via simu-
lation? In this section, I answer these questions in general terms, with very brief 
examples. In Sect. 4, I provide extended illustrations inspired by scientific practice.
3.1  Evidence from Simulation
Many accounts of evidence have been developed in philosophy of science and in 
epistemology (see e.g. Achinstein 2014; Kelly 2016). Some accounts make evidence 
relative to what an agent believes or knows, while others do not. Some allow that 
fact e is evidence for hypothesis h if it provides some support for h, while others 
require that e provides strong support for h if it is to count as evidence. And so 
on. In order to keep the analysis here manageable, I consider the evidential status 
of simulation results from the perspective of just two accounts of evidence. I do 
not mean to endorse either of these accounts as the best available, though each has 
something to recommend it; my aim is to show that simulation results can be evi-
dence for hypotheses about the world under quite different accounts of evidence.3
The first account is non-agent-relative and requires strong support: some fact (i.e. 
true proposition) e is evidencei for hypothesis h just to the extent that e is a good 
indication of h. Some e is a good indication of h just to the extent that it is likely 
that e would be the case if h were true and not likely that e would be the case if h 
were false. Thus, the fact that (e)  [a person has a particular constellation of unu-
sual medical symptoms] might be  evidencei that (h) [the person has a particular dis-
ease], because those symptoms are highly likely to occur among people who have 
the disease and not likely to occur otherwise. On this view, even before such a dis-
ease is known to exist—indeed even if nobody ever discovers it—the symptoms are 
3 These two accounts also correspond to two different types of evidence discussed by Kelly (2016), 
which he calls indicator and normative evidence, respectively.
2 The reliability attributed to a process generating a particular result—say, a weather forecast for Lon-
don—can vary, depending on how the process is conceptualized (e.g. as one generating forecasts for 
London, or for London in the winter, or for London when the recent weather has been such-and-such, 
etc.). This is a well-known problem faced by process reliabilism in epistemology (see e.g. Conee and 
Feldman 1998; see Hájek 2007 for a general discussion of the reference class problem in philosophy of 
science). In what follows, I assume that a reasonable domain of application is specified, picking out a 
description of the simulation procedure as one generating results for that domain.
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evidence of its presence. In the extreme, e is a perfect indicator of h. In a genuinely 
deterministic system, for instance, the fact that (e) [the system is in state s at time t1] 
guarantees (and thus counts as particularly strong evidence, or perhaps even proof) 
that (h) [it will be in state s’ at a later time t2].
By contrast, a standard Bayesian account makes evidence relative to an epis-
temic situation and requires only that e provides some support for hypothesis h: fact 
e is evidenceB for h for agent A just in case learning e warrants an increase in the 
probability that A assigns to h, given A’s background knowledge (see e.g. Howson 
and Urbach 2007). Whether learning e warrants such an increase in probability is 
determined by Bayes’ Theorem: p(h|e) = p(e|h) x p(h)/p(e), where these probabili-
ties reflect A’s degrees of belief, given her background knowledge. Thus, if agent 
A’s background knowledge includes the fact that a given medical symptom is more 
likely to occur if one has a particular disease than if one does not, then the fact 
that  (e) [she has  that symptom] might be  evidenceB for her that (h) [she has the 
disease]. By contrast, for a different agent A’, who does not have this background 
knowledge about the disease, the fact that (e) [he has that symptom] might not be 
 evidenceB that (h) [he has the disease].
On either of these accounts, it is possible for computer simulation results to be 
evidence for hypotheses about the world. If a simulation system is used in a domain 
of application in which it will very reliably give results that are accurate to within 
a specified margin of error ε, then its result R, attributing to the target the feature r, 
can be  evidencei for (h)  [the target has feature r(± ε)].4 Similarly, R can be  evidenceB 
for  that same h for an epistemic agent who is confident that the simulation system 
has such reliability. For example, if layperson Jane learns from a forecast compari-
son website that a particular weather forecasting system very reliably predicts the 
next-day’s temperature in her city to within a few degrees Celsius, then her learning 
that (e) [today the forecast system predicted 22 °C for tomorrow] could warrant an 
increase in the probability that she assigns to (and thus be  evidenceB for) the hypoth-
esis that (h) [it will be within a few degrees of 22 °C tomorrow].
3.2  What Sort of Evidence?
When a computer simulation result is evidence for a hypothesis h about the world, 
what sort of evidence is it? Is it different in kind from evidence obtained by observ-
ing and experimenting on real-world systems and phenomena? I suggest that it is 
generally different in kind, and that the distinction between first-order and higher-
order evidence can help to articulate the difference.
First-order evidence regarding a proposition or hypothesis h is often character-
ized, roughly, as evidence that bears directly on h (Kelly 2016). The fact that (e) 
[there are drops of water hitting the window of my office] is first-order  evidencei that 
(h) [it is raining outside]. Higher-order evidence is “evidence about the existence, 
4 This is analogous to the way in which a result R from a traditional instrument (e.g. a thermometer) 
is evidence for the hypothesis that the value of the measured parameter T (e.g. temperature) is within 




merits, or significance of a body of evidence” (Feldman 2009, p. 304; see also Chris-
tensen 2010). The fact that (e′) [the expert pathologist tells a patient that the tumour 
in his liver is benign] is  evidence that (h′) [there exists first-order medical evidence 
that (h) [the patient’s tumour is benign]], though the patient might not know what 
that first-order evidence is. Higher-order evidence of this sort—evidence that there 
exists some first-order evidence for a hypothesis h—is often itself evidence for h: 
if the pathologist is highly reliable in determining whether tumours of the liver are 
benign in light of the medical evidence he collects, then his testimony in the case 
of the present patient can be  evidencei that (h) [the patient’s tumour is benign].5 In 
effect, the pathologist’s testimony serves as a proxy for the relevant medical evi-
dence, which the patient either is unaware of or is not in a position to interpret.6
Evidence for a hypothesis about some real-world system that comes from observ-
ing or experimenting on that system is often aptly characterized as first-order evi-
dence. For example, facts about water collected in rain gauges can be first-order evi-
dence for hypotheses about rainfall; the results of randomized controlled trials can 
be first-order evidence for hypotheses about drug efficacy in a population; reports of 
bird sightings in an area can be first-order evidence for hypotheses about changing 
migration patterns; and so on.7 By contrast, when evidence for a hypothesis h about 
the world comes from computer simulation, it is often aptly characterized as higher-
order evidence: it is evidence that there is other evidence for h, which has already 
been collected. This already-collected evidence e underwrites the choice of dynami-
cal equations and/or initial conditions for the simulation that produced the result. In 
the simplest case, the salient, already-collected evidence e consists in observed facts 
about the state of the modelled system at a given time, which informed the choice 
of initial conditions for the simulation: these facts e are  evidencei for a hypothesis 
h about the state of that system at some other time, given that various regularities 
(i.e. law-like relationships) obtain; they are  evidenceB for h for any agent A who 
has knowledge of those regularities, or of a close enough approximation to them. In 
the case of weather forecasting, for instance, the already-collected evidence e might 
5 As Tal and Comesaña (2017) and others have discussed, not all evidence of evidence for a proposition 
p is itself evidence for p. However, the evidence of evidence for p that, according to the discussion below, 
is sometimes provided by computer simulation seems to be an unproblematic case.
6 Upon reflection, the distinction between first-order and higher-order evidence as presented above is 
not clear-cut. While the fact that the dial on my bathroom scale points to 60 kg seems to be first-order 
evidence regarding my current weight, one might argue that it is also higher-order evidence regarding 
my weight: it is evidence that there exists some other evidence regarding my weight, causally upstream 
from the pointer (e.g. the fact that a plate within the scale is displaced by a certain amount or that some 
other mechanical aspect of the scale was in a particular state). On this way of thinking, higher-order evi-
dence of the existence variety—i.e. evidence that there exists other evidence for h—is ubiquitous. There 
are various possible responses. One could add conditions to further limit what counts as higher-order 
evidence. Or one could argue that some facts seem only aptly characterized as higher-order evidence for 
a hypothesis h; facts about the results of inference or derivation from other facts—as in the case of the 
pathologists’ testimony—would be prime candidates.
7 There are exceptions. Increasingly, computational tools are embedded in experiments and observa-
tions; in some of these cases, it might be more apt to characterize the results of the experiments and 
observations as higher-order evidence, with the inputs to the computations understood as first-order evi-
dence.
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consist of observed facts about recent weather conditions, which inform the initial 
conditions of the forecast simulation. This case is discussed further in Sect. 4.
3.3  Genuinely New Knowledge from Simulation
Analyses of the concept of knowledge are at least as numerous as accounts of evi-
dence (see e.g. Ichikawa and Steup 2018). I do not adopt any particular account of 
knowledge in this discussion, with the aim of accommodating various views. For 
purposes of illustration, I will sometimes employ simple accounts, e.g. knowledge 
as justified true belief, or as warranted credence above some threshold, or as true 
belief produced via a sufficiently reliable process, etc. It should become clear in 
what follows that, under a number of different accounts of knowledge, including 
more sophisticated accounts, it will be possible in principle for an epistemic agent to 
come to know that h via computer simulation.
More important for the present analysis is what it means for knowledge to be 
genuinely new. I assume that, if agent A obtains evidence e for hypothesis h, and 
as a consequence comes to know that h, then his knowledge of h is genuinely new 
knowledge just in case h was not already warranted as knowledge for him before he 
obtained e.8 Whether h was already warranted as knowledge for some agent A will 
depend on the account of knowledge adopted, but I will assume that a sufficient con-
dition for some h to be warranted as knowledge for an agent A is that h is logically or 
mathematically entailed by what A already knows.9 Thus, if an agent already knows 
that his height is 1.8 meters, that his weight is 75.5 kilograms and that body mass 
index is defined by one’s weight in kilograms divided by the square of one’s height 
in meters, then he gains no genuinely new knowledge when he learns that his body 
mass index is approximately 23.3.
In the case of simulation then, for an epistemic agent A, knowledge of h gained 
via simulation will be genuinely new knowledge for A if her background knowl-
edge prior to learning the simulation result did not already warrant h as knowledge. 
Recall layperson Jane, who consults the highly-reliable weather forecasting system 
and obtains evidence that (h) [it will be around 22 °C tomorrow]. Her background 
knowledge before consulting the simulation-based forecast presumably was not suf-
ficient to have already warranted h as knowledge for her. So, if she does come to 
know that h after consulting the forecast—because she comes to have a justified true 
belief that h, or comes to have a warranted credence in h above some threshold, 
etc.—then she will have gained genuinely new knowledge of the world via simu-
lation. Her epistemic situation is similar to that in which, in light of the reliable 
8 I take it that some proposition p can be warranted as knowledge for an agent without the agent actually 
knowing that p, e.g. when the agent does not believe that p or even thinks that p is unlikely, because she 
does not recognize that her existing knowledge entails p.
9 A similar view of novelty is resisted by Lusk (2016) when discussing whether simulations provide 
novel empirical data, on the grounds that it is too demanding. I aim to show that agents can gain new 
knowledge from simulation even with a demanding standard for novelty.
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pathologist’s testimony, the medical patient gains genuinely new knowledge that he 
has a benign tumour.
Of course, knowledge of h that is not genuinely new in this sense might be “new” 
to an agent in some other significant sense. For example, it might be psychologically 
new, because the agent is unaware that his or her existing knowledge warrants h 
as knowledge. Knowledge that is “merely” psychologically new can be very valu-
able—in some cases just as valuable as if it were genuinely new—since the agent 
still becomes aware of new premises for reasoning and thus new grounds for action. 
While the focus of this paper is whether computer simulation can provide genuinely 
new knowledge of the world (because that is what is often denied in debates over 
the epistemic power of computer simulation), it is worth remembering that, even in 
cases where an agent gains “merely” psychologically new knowledge via simulation, 
that knowledge can be extremely valuable.
4  Evidence and Knowledge from Simulation in Science Today
It is not only laypersons like Jane but also scientists and engineers who can obtain 
evidence and, in some cases, genuinely new knowledge of the world via computer 
simulation. This is illustrated below by way of two extended examples that, though 
hypothetical, are inspired by and closely resemble real uses of simulation in the 
fields of meteorology and astrophysics, respectively. After presenting the examples, 
I consider how common it is that scientists and engineers today obtain evidence and 
genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation.
4.1  Sam: Evidence and Genuinely New Knowledge
Suppose that Sam the meteorologist is involved in a city project that aims to issue 
public warnings when dangerously high summer temperatures and heat waves are 
coming. A key ingredient to the process will be forecasts from a particular state-of-
the-art weather forecasting system developed at a national meteorological agency 
(see e.g. Sheridan and Kalkstein 2004 on such warning systems). Sam was not 
involved in the construction of the weather forecasting system, but he knows quite a 
bit about how systems like it work: starting from initial conditions that are estimated 
from recent observations of the atmosphere, they repeatedly estimate solutions to a 
set of dynamical equations grounded in theoretical knowledge from fluid dynamics, 
thermodynamics, cloud physics, etc.
Sam himself possesses some of this theoretical knowledge, since it was part of 
his general training as a meteorologist, but he lacks much of the detailed, specialist 
knowledge that was used in formulating the model; it has components representing 
different atmospheric processes (e.g. cloud and rain formation), each developed by 
scientists who are experts on those particular processes. Nevertheless, after consult-
ing data on the forecast system’s performance, Sam knows that, in recent years, it 
has almost always predicted summer high temperatures for his city to within a few 
degrees Celsius, a couple of days ahead of time. Let us assume, then, that Sam has 
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good reason to believe that the forecast system is highly reliable when it comes to 
that predictive task. Moreover, suppose that the forecast system really is reliable in 
this way.10
Then on either of the views of evidence discussed above, the fact that (e)  [the 
forecasting system gave result R today, indicating that it will be 41  °C in 2 days’ 
time], will count as evidence that (h) [it will be around 41 °C in 2 days’ time]. R 
is a good indication that h, given the forecasting system’s reliability, and, since 
Sam knows of this reliability, its giving result R = 41 °C warrants an increase in his 
degree of belief that h.
Moreover, the fact that the forecasting system gave result R is aptly characterized 
as higher-order evidence: it is evidence that there exists first-order meteorological 
evidence that it will be around 41 °C in two days’ time in Sam’s city. This first-order 
evidence consists of facts about recent weather conditions, the observation of which 
informed the initial conditions of the forecast simulation. Facts about recent weather 
conditions can be  evidencei regarding soon-to-arrive conditions, if the latter evolve 
from the former in a way that can be described rather accurately with a determin-
istic set of equations. (It has long been the standard view in meteorology  that  the 
short-term evolution of atmospheric conditions can be so described; the core theo-
retical equations of dynamic meteorology are deterministic.) Likewise, those facts 
about recent weather conditions can be  evidenceB regarding later conditions for 
someone who knows enough about the physical processes by which one state of the 
atmosphere evolves to another (i.e. who can formulate a sufficiently accurate set of 
dynamical equations).11
Sam himself might not have this first-order meteorological evidence; he might 
be unacquainted with the relevant facts about recent weather conditions that con-
stitute the relevant  evidencei (and that would be  evidenceB for an agent with suf-
ficient background knowledge) for the hypothesis that (h) [it will be around 41 °C in 
2 days’ time]. Nevertheless, he knows enough to recognize that the forecast system’s 
producing result R is evidence that, somewhere among the observations of earlier 
meteorological conditions that were collected, there is  evidencei for h. The forecast 
system reveals to Sam what  the available meteorological evidence indicates about 
coming temperatures in his city.
If the support for h provided by result R is sufficient for Sam to come to know that 
h—because he comes to have a justified true belief that h or a warranted credence 
in h above some threshold, etc.—then, like Jane the layperson, he will have gained 
genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation, since his background mete-
orological and other scientific knowledge, while considerable, presumably was not 
10 This is not implausible; see e.g. UK Met Office 2016
11 Evidence for dynamical relationships among meteorological variables, knowledge of which informs 
the dynamical equations of the forecasting model, are also part of the ‘total evidence’ that is available. 
In the analysis given here, knowledge of those dynamical relationships is treated as part of the back-
ground knowledge of the meteorology experts who built the model (and of Sam too, insofar as he knows 
those relationships); facts about the recent state of the atmosphere, observations of which inform the 
initial conditions for the forecast, are understood as additional, newly-obtained evidence to be taken into 
account when forming beliefs about future weather. The dynamical relationships will be foregrounded in 
the second example in this section, involving Sarah.
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sufficient to have warranted h as knowledge for him on its own.12 (And of course 
even if the support for h provided by R isn’t strong enough to warrant h as knowl-
edge for him, it might be enough for him to advise city officials to issue a public 
warning for high temperatures, given what’s at stake.)
4.2  Sarah: Evidence but No Genuinely New Knowledge
Suppose that astrophysicist Sarah wants to explain a surprising feature of objects 
in the Kuiper belt, a large collection of icy bodies in the region beyond Neptune. In 
particular, she wants to explain why an orbital parameter, f, tends to take values near 
zero for these objects. She hypothesizes that the gravitational pull of an undiscov-
ered large, distant planet could be the cause (see Batygin and Brown 2016 for the 
scientific study on which this example is based). To test the quantitative plausibility 
of this explanation, she plans to conduct a series of numerical experiments: she will 
run computer simulations exploring how test particles (putative Kuiper belt objects) 
behave in the presence of known massive bodies in the solar system as well as a 
hypothetical additional planet, under different assumptions about the mass, distance, 
eccentricity of orbit, etc. of the additional planet. She will check whether Kuiper 
belt objects in these simulations tend to have f ≈ 0.
Sarah knows that gravitational forces are what matter for her question, and she 
has good reason to believe that, for the level of accuracy she requires, the dynam-
ics of interest can adequately represented using Newtonian physics (i.e. relativistic 
effects and other forces can be ignored). She formulates a set of dynamical equations 
K accordingly. Since these equations cannot be solved analytically, Sarah imple-
ments an approximate version of K—call it K*—into a computer simulation model 
and will rely on the computer to carry out the many calculations needed to estimate 
solutions using numerical methods; for each hypothetical additional planet consid-
ered, a few dozen simulations will be run, assuming different initial conditions for 
the Kuiper belt object in each case. The goal is for the results of interest from each 
simulation—results related to the value of f—to approximate the corresponding 
entailments of K (see Fig. 1), and thus to reveal whether, for some of these planetary 
scenarios, Kuiper belt objects would tend to have orbits with f ≈ 0.
Suppose Sarah finds that, when planetary parameters are assigned values Φ in 
her simulations, many of the simulations do give results {R} indicating f ≈ 0. Let us 
abbreviate this finding as K
𝛷
⊢(f ≈ 0) . If her simulation procedure is a highly reli-
able means of estimating (to within an acceptable margin of error) the values that 
12 I am assuming that Sam did not consult weather charts depicting conditions in the region for the pre-
ceding days and formulate a forecast of his own; he instead has some prior for the hypothesis that (h) it 
will be around 41 °C in 2 days’ time that reflects his background knowledge of the climate of his region 
(e.g. it’s rarely above 40 °C, even in the summer). Even if Sam had consulted weather charts and formu-
lated his own forecast, whether the hypothesis that (h) it will be around 41 °C in 2 days’ time would be 
warranted as knowledge for him would depend on the details of his background knowledge, on the extent 
of information consulted, etc. It is more plausible that, as a result of such independent forecasting efforts, 
at best a coarser-grained hypothesis like  (hc) it will get hot in the coming days would be warranted as 
knowledge for him.
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orbital parameter f would take in planetary scenarios like those investigated, then her 
results {R} are  evidencei that (h) [If there were an extra planet in the solar system 
with properties Φ, then Kuiper belt objects would tend to have orbits with f ≈ 0]. The 
evidence that {R} provides can be aptly characterized as higher-order evidence: it is 
evidence that there exists other evidence for h, some of which has already been col-
lected. This time, the already-collected evidence is that which underwrites the for-
mulation of the dynamical equations for the simulation model. It is difficult to pre-
cisely characterize this body of evidence, but it presumably includes, among other 
things, a wide range of facts about the past motions of planets and other masses in 
the solar system, which have been found to fit the predictions of Newtonian theory 
well enough (and which lead Sarah and other physicists to believe that the domain 
of applicability of Newtonian theory includes the sorts of planetary scenarios under 
investigation).
From a Bayesian perspective as well, an analysis of the evidence that {R} pro-
vides to Sarah is more complex. The standard Bayesian view assumes that epistemic 
agents are logically/mathematically omniscient. Thus, if it is true that K
𝛷
⊢(f ≈ 0) , 
then Sarah should immediately know this; she should have no need for computer 
simulation. Actual epistemic agents, of course, are not mathematically/logically 
omniscient. Before Sarah runs her simulations, she does not know that K
𝛷
⊢(f ≈ 0) ; 
she presumably has at most a moderate (prior) degree of belief that it is true.
Suppose, however, that Sarah is confident, and for good reason, that her simu-
lations are revealing, to within an acceptable margin of error, the relevant entail-
ments of K. Her confidence in this might stem from her understanding of the math-











Fig. 1  Learning about entailment, via simulation. K is a set of propositions about a real-world target, in 
the form of a set of mathematical equations. K entails an answer to a question of interest about the target, 
but it is unclear to an agent what that answer is. K is (usually imperfectly) implemented as K* in a com-
puter simulation model M. Running the model produces solution(s) S, which may need to be processed or 
otherwise transformed to arrive at result R, providing a putative answer to the question of interest about 
the target. The goal is for R to approximate the (unknown) answer entailed by K 
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simulation model and from tests she has performed on the algorithm (see e.g. 
Oberkampf and Roy 2010; Winsberg 2010). In that case, the set of simulation results 
{R}, many of which indicate f ≈ 0, will be  evidenceB for her for the mathematical/
logical hypothesis that K
𝛷
⊢(f ≈ 0) . But since, as noted above, Sarah is already con-
fident that K adequately represents the relevant physics of the planetary scenarios 
she is investigating, when she obtains  evidenceB from simulation that K𝛷⊢(f ≈ 0) , 
she is at the same time obtaining  evidenceB that (h) [If there were an extra planet 
in the solar system with properties Φ, then Kuiper belt objects would tend to have 
orbits with f ≈ 0]. She adjusts her confidence in h not by updating via Bayes’ theo-
rem but because she recognizes that, if she is confident that what K entails about the 
situation is accurate, and she has good evidence that K entails h, then as a matter of 
coherence she should be confident that h too.
Once again, the evidence here seems aptly characterized as higher-order evidence: 
simulation results {R} constitute evidence for Sarah that she already had evidence for 
h, insofar as she had evidence that the dynamical equations of K adequately represent 
planetary systems like those being investigated. When she adjusts her confidence in h 
in light of {R}, she is in effect correcting it, so that it better reflects the import of the 
evidence that she already had. Insofar as this correction serves to align Sarah’s con-
fidence in h with her confidence that K adequately represents the planetary scenarios 
under investigation, she presumably will not come to know that h in light of the cor-
rection unless she knows that K adequately represents such planetary systems. Thus, 
if Sarah comes to know that h via her simulation study, that knowledge might be psy-
chologically new, because she wasn’t previously aware of the entailments of her exist-
ing knowledge, but it will not be genuinely new knowledge.
Note that Sarah’s simulation results {R} can be higher-order evidence not just for 
the hypothesis that an as-yet-undiscovered planet could be the cause of the surpris-
ing fact that Kuiper belt objects tend to have orbits with f ≈ 0, but also for the bolder 
hypothesis that (H) [there actually exists an additional planet in the solar system, 
with properties Φ]. To see why, note that Sarah takes the implications of K
훷
 to be 
a close approximation to the implications of H. So when her simulations provide 
 evidenceB that K𝛷⊢(f ≈ 0) , they in effect provide  evidenceB for her that H⊢e , where 
e is the surprising fact that [Kuiper belt objects tend to have orbits with f ≈ 0]. Had 
this entailment relationship been known to Sarah before the discovery of e—as it 
would have been for someone logically/mathematically omniscient—then her learn-
ing of e would have increased the probability that she assigns to H, in accordance 
with Bayes’ theorem. By providing Sarah with  evidenceB of the entailment rela-
tionship, her simulation results {R} seem aptly characterized as evidence that she 
already had evidenceB for H, in the form of e.
In this case too, it seems that Sarah ought to adjust her degree of belief—this 
time in H. But here we encounter the well-known ‘problem of old evidence’ for 
Bayesian confirmation theory: by the time Sarah becomes confident that H⊢e via 
simulation, she already knows that e, so she assigns p(e) ≈ 1; but then H gains little 
or no boost in probability from e when updating in accordance with Bayes’ theo-
rem, even though, intuitively, the fact that H can account for surprising fact e should 
count in its favor. Various solutions to this problem have been proposed (see e.g. 
Sprenger 2015), including counterfactual approaches that recommend updating the 
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probability of H assuming p(e) takes the value that one would have assigned before 
learning e and approaches that take the evidence for H in such situations to be the 
fact that that H⊢e , rather than e itself. In effect, these proposals provide an agent 
like Sarah with guidance on how to correct her degree of belief in H, once she real-
izes that H⊢e.
4.3  How Common Is It?
In the examples above, the scientists have good reason to be confident that the simu-
lation systems they are consulting are highly reliable in the domains of application 
at hand. While these examples are inspired by real uses of simulation in science 
today, it is fair to say that such epistemic situations are not the norm; there is often 
significant uncertainty about the extent to which simulations provide accurate infor-
mation about the world. There are various reasons for this. One is that scientists 
often lack the data they need to directly test the performance of simulation systems 
in domains of application of interest. This might be because the system or phenom-
enon of interest is spatially and/or temporally remote, or because the question of 
interest pertains to the behaviour of a system under boundary conditions quite dif-
ferent from those experienced so far. Conclusions about reliability are made more 
difficult insofar as these systems and phenomena are also nonlinear, complex, and/or 
not-well-understood theoretically.
Nevertheless, the examples involving Sam and Sarah are intended to make plausi-
ble that at least some computer simulation results today can be evidence for hypoth-
eses about the world, and can be recognized as such; sometimes scientists do have 
trustworthy theoretical resources for building simulation models and are able to sub-
ject their simulation models to a range of tests on relevant data. Additional examples 
undoubtedly could be given, especially from engineering practice, where computer 
simulation is now commonly used to explore designs for products and for a range of 
other purposes. Moreover, in the examples involving Sam and Sarah, the simulation 
results constitute evidence even on a relatively demanding view of what counts as 
evidence (the good indication view). On less demanding views, simulation results 
will qualify as evidence more often. Under a standard Bayesian view, for instance, 
an increase in an agent’s degree of belief in some hypothesis h = R(± ε) can be war-
ranted by some result R even when it is thought to be only slightly more likely than 
not that the source will have given a result that is within ε of the truth. So results 
from today’s computer simulations might relatively often constitute at least weak 
 evidenceB for hypotheses about the world.13
13 Some philosophers have argued that, even when the reliability of a simulation system in a domain 
of application is largely unknown, its results might nevertheless constitute evidence that some state of 
affairs remains a real possibility, i.e. something that we don’t have good reason to think couldn’t occur 
(Katzav 2014; see Betz 2015 for complications). Detailed examination of such situations must be left 
for another time. Likewise, there is not space to consider here whether very simple models that are not 
intended to represent any particular real-world system—such as Schelling’s checkerboard model—can 
provide evidence for hypotheses about the world and, if so, how this works (see e.g. Grüne-Yanoff 2013 
for a related discussion). Both sorts of cases merit further investigation, however.
 W. S. Parker 
1 3
Similarly, how common it is that today’s scientists gain genuinely new knowledge 
from simulation depends on the view of knowledge that one adopts, on what indi-
vidual epistemic agents already know and on facts about today’s computer simula-
tion systems (e.g. their reliability). Given that the reliability of today’s simulation 
systems is often significantly uncertain, it may be a relatively rare occurrence that 
today’s scientists gain knowledge of the world via simulation and, ipso facto, a rela-
tively rarely occurrence that they gain genuinely new knowledge. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to overlook that there can be situations like Sam’s—indeed, it is plau-
sible that actual meteorologists and various other users of weather forecasts today 
often do gain genuinely new knowledge of the world via simulation.14
5  What’s Special About Computer Simulation?
The perspicuous reader might have noticed that an analysis similar to that given in 
the last two sections can also be given for results derived from models or theories 
without the help of computers; these results too can be evidence for hypotheses 
about the world. For instance, if a procedure used to derive a result R from theoreti-
cal equations using pencil and paper is highly reliable (to within ε) for the domain 
of application at hand, then R can be  evidencei for a hypothesis h = R(± ε) about 
the world. Once again, the evidence seems aptly characterized as higher-order evi-
dence—it is evidence that other evidence for h has been collected (which informed 
the choice of premises for the derivation). The same will be true of results derived 
with a handheld calculator or even in someone’s head.15 It does not follow, however, 
that there is nothing distinctive or special about computer simulation as a means of 
obtaining evidence for hypotheses about the world.
Most notably, computer simulation is helpful when the body of first-order evi-
dence for a hypothesis, and/or the background knowledge needed to interpret that 
body of first-order evidence, is large, complex and distributed across multiple 
agents. For some questions about the world that scientists would like to answer with 
the help of existing knowledge—such as questions about earth’s climate system or 
about the results of particle collisions in the Large Hadron Collider—the body of 
knowledge relevant to the question is enormous and complex, spanning multiple 
fields of expertise. Even if an individual scientist possessed that body of knowl-
edge, learning its implications in particular cases via paper-and-pencil calculation or 
14 These simulation systems can be used to learn about past weather events too (e.g. diagnosing causal 
relationships). Thus even if one thinks that knowledge of the future is in principle impossible, there is 
almost certainly some knowledge of the world gained from these simulation systems.
15 For creatures like us, the application of mathematics or logic is always at the same time an empiri-
cal process; calculations or derivations are carried out using pencil and paper, or in a brain, or with a 
computer, or with a handheld calculator, etc. Facts about those empirical processes—that they culmi-
nated in particular inscriptions or brain states or computer states—can constitute  evidencei for hypoth-
eses about other natural or social systems insofar as they are good indications of the truth/falsity of those 
hypotheses. Usually, when such facts about the results of derivation/calculation are evidence in this way, 
it is because the derivations/calculations started from propositions informed by knowledge of those real-
world systems.
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unaided reasoning would be practically infeasible. In many cases, however, no sin-
gle scientist does possess the full body of existing, relevant knowledge; it is distrib-
uted in various ways among a broader scientific community. In such cases, computer 
simulation models not only serve to augment the computational powers of human 
beings (Humphreys 2004) but also serve as sites of community knowledge integra-
tion (Galison 1997; Gramelsberger 2011), where the implications of (one distillation 
of) collective knowledge can be explored. In  situations like these, it may be that 
every individual scientist in the community can obtain genuinely new knowledge 
that h via the simulation, because none of them individually knows enough for h to 
be already warranted as knowledge.16
However, features of computer simulation also bring some distinctive epistemic 
challenges. Because of the complexity of many simulation algorithms, and because 
of the sheer number of calculations performed in a simulation, the process of obtain-
ing evidence via simulation often has an opacity (Humphreys 2004) from the human 
agent’s perspective that is not present when the agent works out the implications her-
self. Likewise, trust in the results of the simulation can be built in various ways, but 
not usually by having human agents verify that each individual step of the simula-
tion was carried out as the model-builders intended. In addition, because simulation 
models are often the product of a range of ingredients, including simplified imple-
mentations of various scientific theories, numerical solution methods, compilers—
and sometimes ad hoc assumptions and mathematical tricks as well—the process 
of determining whether a simulation system has succeeded in revealing (something 
close to) the implications of an existing body of knowledge, or provides evidence 
for some hypothesis h about the world, can be a much more motley affair (Winsberg 
2001) than the process of determining the same for a pencil-and-paper calculation. 
It is precisely because of these and other distinctive features of computer simulation 
that its epistemology—especially how and when trust in simulation results can be 
justified and how uncertainties associated with results should be probed and char-
acterized—has been of particular interest to philosophers of science (see e.g. Wins-
berg 1999, 2010; Parker 2008).
6  Conclusion
The foregoing goes some way toward reconciling the competing intuitions about 
computer simulation introduced at the outset: computer simulation is a methodology 
capable of providing evidence for hypotheses about real-world systems and phenom-
ena, but evidence from simulation is of a different sort than the (first-order) evidence 
that is typically obtained from observation and experiment. In particular, evidence 
from simulation is more aptly characterized as a type of higher-order evidence: it is 
evidence that other evidence for a hypothesis h about the world has been collected. 
16 The closer a situation is to this extreme, the more misleading it seems to say that no genuinely new 
knowledge of the world was gained via simulation, even though it is true that simulation models do not 
provide information about the world beyond that which is already implicit in their assumptions.
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This already-collected evidence—a kind of ‘old evidence’—informs the construc-
tion of the simulation model, whether its dynamical equations, its initial conditions, 
or both. Put differently, running a simulation can help epistemic agents to see that 
some available information or data is evidence for h, though they might not have 
recognized it before.
If the evidence for h that a simulation provides is strong enough that an agent 
comes to know that h, then this will be genuinely new knowledge for the agent if 
h was not previously warranted as knowledge for them. This might happen, for 
instance, if the agent is unacquainted with the already-collected evidence whose 
existence is indicated by simulation, or if the agent lacks background knowledge in 
light of which that already-collected data or information can be interpreted as evi-
dence for h. Such epistemic situations are common not just for laypersons but also 
for many scientists and engineers today, since the latter often use complex simula-
tion models that they did not construct themselves and that reflect a range of highly-
specialized knowledge. If it is relatively rare that such scientists and engineers do 
obtain genuinely new knowledge of real-world systems and phenomena from simu-
lation, this is because of uncertainty about the reliability of particular simulation 
systems—and thus about the strength of the evidence they provide—rather than 
some inherent limitation of simulation.
This is not to deny that simulation models can only provide information about 
the world that is already implicit in their assumptions. For a hypothetical agent who 
somehow possessed in a coherent way the knowledge of a scientific community 
(or communities) as a whole, and who employed that knowledge to build reliable 
simulation systems, there would be no genuinely new knowledge of the world from 
simulation. In practice, however, many epistemic agents, including many individual 
scientists and engineers, are simply not in anything close to that epistemic situation. 
For them, it is possible to gain not only evidence but also genuinely new knowledge 
of the world from simulation. And it is plausible that, in some cases, they actually 
do so.
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